College basketball is changing.

There are a number of trends that are changing the way the game is played, teams are built and games are won. Rampant transfers, the increasing number of one-and-done players and even changes to the three-point line and shot-clock reset have all altered the game.

They're also making it a lot tougher for Northwestern to build a winning program.

In order to explain why these growing trends in college basketball are disproportionately hurting a team like Northwestern, first we need to look at how underdogs have historically built their teams to make deep runs in the NCAA tournament.

The top programs in the country stay at the top by signing the best talent and promising them the greatest opportunity for a professional career based on their track record of success. These teams, like Kentucky, are extremely talented, but also extremely young. They’re superbly athletic, but often lacking in things like three-point shooting and defense.

So how do the underdogs compete? By going the other way. They get that single Top-100 recruit into believing in their program and finding a few diamonds in the rough who are overlooked by the powerhouses with the potential do certain things to make your system work. They develop them, enduring a couple seasons of growing pains as they gain experience.

The hope is that they can reap their rewards during their junior and senior seasons. Then, when that seasoned, less-talented team faces the more talented-but-younger team, they’ve spent a couple seasons fine-tuning their defensive and offensive schemes. They don't have defensive lapses and know their roles.

On the other side, the talented-but-young team mis-communicates on a defensive switch. Their third highest-rated freshman is playing for a first-round evaluation more than a victory. Collectively, they have no answer for the well-oiled machine that is the veteran underdog squad.

Northwestern essentially used that model to build its 2017 breakthrough tournament team. Head coach Chris Collins convinced four-star Chicago recruit Vic Law (he was ranked 103rd by Rivals) to be the cornerstone of his vision. He found Bryant McIntosh, who was overlooked for his lack of athletic ability and initially committed to Indiana State. He snagged Scottie Lindsey after his stock dropped because of a senior year injury. The next year, he followed up that class up by finding Dererk Pardon, who was overlooked for his lack of size as a center. Then, senior Sanjay Lumpkin provided the grit and leadership necessary to push the Wildcats to earn the first ticket to the Big Dance in school history.

But now, just three years later, the changing landscape of college basketball is making it so this model is increasingly becoming more difficult to accomplish.

Before we get into how and why, we first need to discuss the biggest issue that everyone talks about when it comes to Northwestern basketball recruiting: admissions. NU’s high academic standards make it so somewhere around 80% of the top 300 recruits in the country won't get admitted. Only a select few schools outside of the Ivy League have to deal with this issue.

You could make the case that the admissions issue is moot because all schools have to deal with the trends we're highlighting, regardless of academic standards. But my contention is that because of the high admissions standards, these trends disproportionately affect a team like Northwestern. They start so far behind the eight-ball that making up ground is sometimes more difficult that coming back from a 20-point, second-half deficit.

That said, here are some trends that I feel hurt NU’s ability to be competitive for the future.

A revolving door of players coming into and going out of the program is the easiest way to destroy the chemistry of a basketball team. It's hard to build up a team when classes aren't staying together. And it's hard to build up competitive depth when your backups are constantly transferring and you have to replace them with freshmen.

It's no secret that more players are opting to transfer to other schools rather than sticking it out at their original school. The player empowerment era that has overtaken the NBA is trickling down into the college ranks, giving players the mindset to take their basketball careers into their own hands. Now, with the online transfer portal, it is easier than ever for players to start the process.

In the Big Ten, there have been 72 transfers over the last four classes. That's just over five per school and one per school, per class. Whether these roster spots are being replaced by a graduate transfer, a transfer that has to sit out a year, a JUCO player or a freshman, it's a new unfamiliar face that notches the chemistry meter down a tick. This increases the gap between teams like Northwestern and other teams that are able to recruit at higher levels.

The Wildcats lost three seniors to transfer after last season (Jordan Ash, Barret Benson and Aaron Falzon). While none of them were likely to be impact players, their exodus set Northwestern up for failure this season.

Currently, there is only one active upperclassmen on the team who played for NU last year: AJ Turner. The other, Anthony Gaines, was lost for the season due to injury. Patrick Spencer is a graduate transfer, but he played lacrosse at Loyola-Maryland and hasn't played organized basketball since high school.

The lack of experienced upperclassmen means that sophomores and freshmen have ample opportunity for playing time. That can be beneficial for the Wildcats in the future, but it's hurting them now in terms of developing young talent now.

Simply said, competitive depth helps develop young talent. When Bryant McIntosh was a freshman, he had to compete everyday with senior point guard Dave Sobolewski. McIntosh was clearly the better player from the beginning, but the amount of knowledge McIntosh likely received from a veteran player at his position helped set him up for the career that he had.

On the other hand, Ash knew that he was likely not going to be a starter in his senior year and decided to transfer to Wright State last spring. While there is nothing wrong with his decision on a personal level, from the perspective of the program, it hurt the development of freshman Boo Buie.

Watching Ash's leadership and work ethic, and having to score against his stout defense in practice every day, could have done wonders for Buie's development. But instead, he has to compete with a graduate transfer with no college basketball experience in Spencer, and seldom-used sophomore Ryan Greer.

The same can be said for big men Ryan Young and Jared Jones. They could have had a year of competing with Benson, but instead they just compete with each other while Benson plays at Southern Illinois.

And don't you think a currently struggling Pete Nance could have benefited from the guidance of Falzon? Instead, he is thrust into a position of leadership as the most experienced big on the team as a sophomore.

How much does competitive depth and mentorship matter to development? It's hard to quantify. But the only team in the Big Ten that didn't have a single transfer in the last four years is also the most consistent: Michigan State.

Not too long ago, the adage was: if you’re a lottery pick, then declare for the NBA draft; if not, stay another year.

But now, many players are leaving early without consensus first-round grades. Big Ten stars like Justin Jackson, Bruno Fernando, Charles Matthews, Ignas Brazdeikis, Nick Ward, Amir Coffey, Isaiah Roby and Tony Carr are examples of players who in the past would have stayed in college for four years. Instead they went pro early, most knowing they’ll likely be in the D-League for years, if not Europe.

Then, there is five-star prospect RJ Hampton, the No. 6 player in the 2019 class, who decided to avoid the college basketball experience completely and play professionally in Australia for a year. With the likely end of the one-and-done rule on the horizon, more top talent may choose to forgo college for overseas or the D-League.

How does this trend affect Northwestern, a school that isn't likely to send a player to the NBA early? Isn't it just taking competition out of the way for the Wildcats?

Yes, it is. But it also means that teams losing these stars have to replenish their roster in the next year’s freshman class. This puts NU further back in the pecking order than they otherwise would be for recruits.

When a player leaves Duke after a year, Duke then goes out and signs a five-star player who otherwise would have gone to, say, Louisville. Louisville then signs a player who would otherwise have gone to Michigan. And Michigan signs a player that would have otherwise gone to NU. It's a chain reaction that ends with NU missing out on a player who might otherwise have been available. This problem is exacerbated for a program like NU that already has a limited field to choose from because of academics.

If you consider that only 10 to 15 of the top 50 point guards qualify for NU academically, this can have a snowballing negative affect on the Wildcats. With top programs needing to replenish more often due to transfers and early exits, losing even one or two more options due to these chain reactions can make a world of difference for the Cats.

For the 2019-2020 season, the three-point line was extended from 20-feet, 9-inches to 22-feet, 1¾-inches. Obviously, this makes the three-point shot harder to make, and long-distance shooting is maybe the most obvious way an underdog can knock off a favorite.

But maybe more importantly, with increased spacing, it makes defensive rotations harder to execute. That extra foot and change makes for an easier drive to the basket or a more open shot from the wing as defenders scramble to cover more space.

Another rule implemented this season is the clock resetting after an offensive rebound from 30 seconds to 20 seconds. This is an effort to increase the number of possessions per game.

That shorter clock favors the traditional powers with the most talent. Historically, teams of lesser talent have tried to slow the game down in order to limit the number of possessions a more-talented opponent has. Now, that already difficult task is made nearly impossible.

These two rules are limiting the effect of tactics that underdog teams like NU have used in the past to upset higher-rated opponents. Now, that tactic, which Collins used a lot in his first few years in Evanston, when the Wildcats relied on defense and controlling the pace, is much less effective.

Making Northwestern a competitive program is already one of the most difficult jobs in the country due to the school's high academic standards, as well as a lack of any kind of wining tradition.

Now, with the increase in roster instability due to transfers, the shallowing of the player pool due to increased early exits, and the rule implementations making underdog strategies less effective, the margin of error for Collins and the Wildcats will become even slimmer.